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A Case for Creative 
Misunderstanding  
 
  
The differences between us necessitate the 
dialogue, rather than disallow it – a dialogue 
must take place, precisely because we don’t speak 
the same language. (Ahmed, 2000, p. 180, italics 
in the original) 
 
Human ways of life increasingly influence, 
dominate, parody, translate, and subvert one 
another. (Clifford, 1986, p. 22) 
 
I begin with an admission: I’m not Māori, not indigenous 
in any place or in any way that would allow me to speak and 
write with such authority. Nor, for that matter, am I a dancer. 
I’m an American theatre-trained, performance ethnographer. 
As a performance ethnographer, everywhere I go, everywhere I 
look, I see performances, and while I may not understand the 
language or conventions of the performances I see, even so I 
tell the story of my seeing performances to others.  
This paper explores the position of the spectator/scholar 
in relation to indigenous performance – in this case, Kapa 
Haka. While not slighting the problematics of the power 
dynamic in watching and writing about performances that, 
lacking language and cultural identifications, I cannot 
comprehend literally, this paper makes a case for creative 
misunderstanding. It values the scholarly production of 
meanings that can be put into play, connecting, challenging, 
contesting and creating conversations across the cultural 
divide in ways that may not always be correct but that, in the 
friction between the two sides of an exchange, might just 
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provoke new ways of thinking about, as well as of making, 
performance in and of culture. 
Over the years, I have been increasingly troubled by a 
trend in Performance Studies toward utopianism, as 
epitomised by Jill Dolan in her highly influential book Utopia 
in Performance (2005). Dolan takes an idealist’s idealistic 
stance, arguing for theatrical experiences that are bathed in 
celebrations of communitas, in which spectators and 
performers see themselves reflected in a mirror of progressive 
values, unified and purified – at least for the duration of the 
performance – of the harsher realities lurking just outside. 
Selecting performances with which she can directly identify 
herself – as a ‘feminist, or lesbian, or Jew’ – Dolan argues that 
others need not make the same direct identification; in 
utopian performance, ‘being a human being [is] enough’ (p. 
25).  
Touching, isn’t it? Tempting too. After decades of 
identitarian politics and political correctness, of striving, to 
discover ourselves (hopefully) as one sort of marginalised 
‘Other’ or another and, often failing, to be simply human 
again. It is a profound desire, expressed by someone who has 
risen to the top of the academic hierarchy and who is, as such, 
extraordinarily privileged: to be able to transcend one’s social 
particulars – especially those that might align us with the 
histories of oppression and colonisation – to partake of acts of 
dis-identification with the dominant (by implication male, 
straight, white) culture, to be not-this-but-that . . . at least for 
the duration of the performance. I can be human. I can be a 
good person. Utopian indeed. 
Dolan is writing about the theatre, picking up where Tim 
Miller and David Román left off ten years earlier when they 
valorised the act of ‘Preaching to the Converted’ (1995). Like 
Dolan, Miller and Román want to defend productions like 
Angels in America, the sort of political theatre in the USA that 
was at the time being accused of creating a reflective circle 
between performers and spectators that is, temporarily at 
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least, closed against the imprecations of outsiders. They argue 
that their audience is actually diverse in its own way: being 
gay is only one aspect of identities in which gender, race and 
class also play significant roles. Queer is the connective 
thread; being together in being oppressed joins performers and 
audiences regardless of orientation. The references to 
‘preaching’ and ‘choir’ are deliberate. Like Dolan, Miller and 
Román do not shy from piety in claiming that a kind of 
virtuous humanity is inculcated in those who are part of this 
performance event. Surrender difference all ye who enter the 
theatre here, and for the time being at least you won’t have to 
worry about being on the wrong side of the cultural divide. 
 
 
Photo: Stephen A’Court – Tiki Taane Mahuta, by Tanemahuta 
Gray 
Pictured: Jana Castillo and Luke Hanna 
 
A Case for Creative Misunderstanding 
 
Te Kaharoa, vol. 8, SPECIAL EDITION, the Kowhiti Atarau collection, 2015, 
ISSN 1178-6035 
90 
This utopian desire to see oneself as a good person, to 
identify with the oppressed rather than the oppressor, in the 
theatre is not limited to performers and audiences. This 
participatory piety is a kind of plague that has also infected 
academics as well in ways that I find contradictory and deeply 
disturbing. Its origins can be traced, in part, I think to Laura 
Mulvey’s feminist theorising, beginning in the early 1970s, 
about the gaze: the masculine position of the one who looks 
against the feminised position of the one who is looked at.1 If 
the act of looking itself identifies the one who looks with the 
dominant culture, the oppressor, then who really wants to go 
there – especially the scholar whose acts of writing can 
therefore be seen to collude with the machinery of power, with 
universities, publishers and politicians?  
Underlying the embrace of the utopian is a deep-seated 
fear of being caught out, to be told ‘you just don’t understand’ 
because you are not ‘one of us’ in the communal circle.2 
Understanding, real understanding, in this construct is only 
possible if the looker and the looked-at are evenly matched, 
ideologically speaking. In large part, this fear of hearing ‘you 
just don’t understand’ is what has led academics away from 
critical thinking, speaking and writing toward more 
expressionistic, diaristic or performative engagements with 
theatre and dance.  
I remember seeing Ann Daly – a first rate scholar of dance 
and performance art – turn an academic paper about Carolee 
Schneeman into a kind of shamanistic conjuring: a 
performance art-esque rendering of the scholar’s desire to 
efface the distance between herself and the object of her 
research. (This was at an Association for Theatre in Higher 
Education conference sometime in the 1990s.) At about the 
same time, at a Modern Language Association conference, with 
about 10,000 people attending, in New York, I also saw 
prominent dance scholar, Susan Leigh Foster, dance her 
paper: stretched arms and legs, intoned odd words . . . I’m not 
sure what that was about, but I still can see her wafting 
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around the table and the other panellists. Soon thereafter I 
started hearing the term ‘performative writing’ used to describe 
the sorts of academic performances I was seeing and also to 
support acts of writing that were self-consciously staged 
against the dominant grain of scholarship.3 Through such 
performative performances, these feminists were self-
consciously denying identification with the dominant culture, 
regardless of their cultural status per se. And soon enough 
they were joined by . . . well . . . by just about everyone in 
academia wanting to occupy the safety of the margins.4  
Remember ‘saming’? That early 1990s pejorative, first 
wave PC term for someone seen to be trying to erase the 
difference between Self and Other? We’re well beyond that 
little bit of ironic self-awareness now. Now both Self and Other 
must be, reflectively, beyond reproach. The current unwritten 
rules of contemporary theatre scholarship are such that it is 
almost impossible to write critically of performance; the 
performance must be worthy, the article must valorise in some 
way, and the writer must demonstrate understanding through 
direct identification with the values represented in the act of 
writing.  
But what happens outside the theatre, on the staging 
grounds of identity in everyday life? How is Performance 
Ethnography even possible on such terms? This is not an idle 
or abstract question. I am an academic whose career has been 
successfully built on research performed in places where it is 
screamingly obvious that I don’t belong: from the 
Unpredictable Johnny Rodz School of Professional Wrestling to 
Te Matatini. I have had my nose rubbed in the improprieties of 
my watching and writing plenty of times, and – more 
importantly – I am regularly reminded of my failure to 
understand what I am watching in terms that can be 
recognised by those whom I am watching. In fact, I have 
written about the power dynamics and problematics of 
Performance Ethnography at regular intervals. In ‘Watching 
Wrestling / Writing Performance’ (2002), for example, I 
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claimed that regardless of the challenges to my presence in 
Gleason’s Gym, I would always have the last word in 
publishing my account of the experience. In ‘Performance: 
Ethnographer / Tourist / Cannibal’ (2011), I went further in 
asserting that writing was always already a distinctive practice 
that should stand, however uneasily, explicitly on its own ‘two 
feet’ alongside the performance, and I proposed that 
‘ethnographers shouldn’t dance.’ In what remains of this 
paper, I want first to take a step back through the past 
decades of discussion about the ethics of ethnography, and 
then to make my case for creative misunderstanding – indeed 
to argue that misunderstanding is intrinsic to the 
ethnographic experience, bound up as it is in the encounter 
between peoples, and that, as such, virtue should be made of 
sterner stuff. 
In ‘Performing as a Moral Act: Ethical Dimensions of the 
Ethnography of Performance’ (1985), Dwight Conquergood 
justifies his practice of performing ethnography, literally, in 
creating performances as well as publishing the results of his 
research in Native American and Southeast Asian immigrant 
communities. For Conquergood, performance – in particular 
ethnographic performance – is ‘the enactment of a moral 
stance’ (p. 4). Faced with hostile audience, Conquergood takes 
this essay as an opportunity to work through his concerns for 
‘the complex ethical tensions, tacit political commitments, and 
moral ambiguities inextricably caught up in the act of 
performing ethnographic materials’; at the same time, 
however, he insists on ‘performance as a way of knowing and 
deeply sensing the other’ (p. 4). It is not, that is, sufficient to 
watch from the stands or the sidelines. To justify his own 
performances and provide instruction for those who would 
follow in his footsteps, he presents a schematic analysis of 
‘ethical pitfalls, performative stances toward the other that are 
morally problematic’ (p. 4): ‘The Custodian’s Rip-Off’; ‘The 
Enthusiast’s Infatuation’; ‘The Skeptic’s Cop-Out’; and ‘The 
Curator’s Exhibitionism’. These stances are placed on a 
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matrix, set between identity and difference on one axis, 
detachment and commitment on the other, with their 
distinctive sins listed and the virtuous aim, ‘Dialogical 
Performance’ (defined as ‘genuine conversation’), at centre.5  
Conquergood’s ‘Moral Map’ appears somewhat as a flight 
from ‘white guilt’, which he simultaneously names and denies. 
It represents an (almost painfully) earnest attempt to reach 
what might be termed ‘ethnographic safety’. With good reason. 
There is no safe place. This does not mean that his ideal – ‘the 
dialogical stance [which] is situated in the space between 
competing ideologies [. . . one that] brings self and other 
together even while it holds them apart’ (p. 9) – is not worth 
pursuing. He wants to see a ‘true respect for the Difference of 
other cultures’ in which ‘we grant them the potential for 
challenging our own culture’ (p. 9). Each voice, he says, 
should have ‘its own integrity’ (p. 10). True that. It’s just that, 
in the end, his argument turns on his desire not so much to 
encounter and come to terms with others, or an Other, but to 
be seen as a moral person: 
 
Dialogical performance is a way of finding the 
moral center as much as it is an indicator that 
one is ethically grounded. One does not have to 
delay entering the conversation until self and 
other have become old friends. Indeed, as the 
metaphor makes clear, one cannot build a 
friendship without beginning a conversation. 
Dialogical performance is the means as much as 
the end of honest intercultural understanding. 
But what are the qualities one absolutely needs 
before joining the conversation? Three 
indispensables, according to [Henry] Glassie: 
energy, imagination, and courage. (p. 10) 
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I’m all for ‘energy, imagination, and courage.’ It’s the ‘we 
grant them the potential’ that gets to me. Who is this ‘we’ to be 
granting – granting! – a ‘them’ what ‘they’ already have?  
 
 
Photo: Stephen A’Court – KIRI by Louise Potiki Bryant 
Pictured: Louise Potiki Bryant 
 
Perhaps my disquiet with what sounds a bit great white 
father-esque to me, stems from the fact that while I started my 
own work as a performance ethnographer around the time 
Conquergood was writing this, my first experiences were with 
professional wrestlers whose ability to challenge my presence 
ringside was never in question. The sure knowledge that they 
could defend themselves against my imprecations was not 
solely founded the obvious differences in physique and 
temperament. They could speak for themselves, quite 
eloquently, in at least two languages. They had their 
explanations for what they were doing, and I had mine. Most 
didn’t care what I had to say, because they were sure they 
knew better. Sometimes – professional wrestling being, I think, 
the epitome of dialogic performance – they invited me to play a 
role – the model spectator, cheering or jeering – or to give 
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feedback – ‘yes, you’re right, that does look really painful’ – or 
just to gossip a bit at the end of the day. One of the more 
dominant wrestlers was himself a PhD candidate in sports 
sociology, whose first major conference paper was an 
ethnographic study of me doing an ethnographic study of him 
called ‘Sometimes a Bloody Nose is Just a Bloody Nose’ (2010). 
It won him, and me, some notoriety and led to further 
academic exchanges that were alternately fierce and convivial, 
and mostly staged for onlookers in order to generate heat of 
the academic persuasion. At base, though, there was a 
recognition between us: his line of sight as a wrestler was, in 
its own way, as limited as mine as a spectator. What mattered, 
when we quarrelled about the facts and significance of what 
had happened during a particular event, was the way the 
ensuing conflict provoked us to think harder, more deeply and 
more widely about how professional wrestling potentially 
produces meanings beyond what was obvious to each of us on 
our own. 
 It is almost certainly unfair of me to criticise Dwight 
Conquergood both for his condescension towards his 
informants and for his denial of his relative power in the 
relationship regardless. He couldn’t help being who he was in 
that room at that time, any more the rest of us can turn away 
from our own, individual and collective, acculturations and 
histories. But like Dolan, twenty years later, his desire to be a 
good person whilst performing acts of scholarship can be seen 
in hindsight to have blinded him to the very differences he 
wanted to discover for himself. After all, how can he – or any of 
us – find out about an Other without seeing himself – our 
Selves – for what he is – for what we are – socially as well as 
morally? 
 Allow me one more leap backwards in time, before I 
come to my own ‘case’. Conquergood leans heavily on his 
predecessors in constructing his ethics of ethnography. Above 
all, from his title to his conclusion, he relies on Clifford Geertz, 
especially Geertz’s essay (1968): ‘Thinking as a Moral Act: 
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Ethical Dimensions of Anthropological Fieldwork in the New 
States’.6 It is to Geertz that Conquergood turns in the end to 
define ‘ethnographic understanding’ as ‘more like grasping a 
proverb, catching an allusion, seeing a joke – or [. . .] reading a 
poem – than it is like achieving communion’ (p. 11).  
Put to one side, for a moment, the underlying assumption 
that the native7 speaks in mysterious ways which are then 
made understandable via the ethnographer’s more 
authoritative, presumptively intelligible, interpretive act. We’ll 
come back to that soon enough. Let’s take a quick look at 
Geertz. Following in the footsteps of the early 20th century 
philosopher, and ‘revolutionary moralist’, John Dewey, Geertz 
begins his essay with two assertions: (1) that ‘thought is 
conduct and is to be morally judged as such’ and (2) that ‘the 
reason thinking is serious is that it is a social act, and that 
one is therefore responsible for it as for any other social act’ 
(1968, p. 139). Sounds like a close ancestor of late 20th 
century Political Correctness, this channelling of early 
American Puritan propriety through the social conscience of 
the 1960s cultural anthropologist, does it not?  
But thinking of ethnographic thinking as a social act 
should provoke us to see ourselves as actors in the social 
drama. Seeing ourselves as actors should open us to 
interrogation on a fundamental level: who am I; what are my 
given circumstances; what is my social status; what do I want; 
what strategies are available to me in pursuing my objectives 
and what do I gain or lose in so doing? Above all, as an actor I 
know I have to discover what comes to me in the course of 
acting, including finding out in more tangible terms who the 
other actors are their circumstances, social realities, 
objectives, etc.8 However, even though Geertz, writing in 1968, 
recognises that he is acted upon as well as acting, looked at as 
well as looking, what he doesn’t fully see is that it’s not a level 
playing field. He encounters his ‘informant’ from a position of 
unthinking superiority, and his conclusion is that . . . well . . . 
much as he’d like to, he just doesn’t understand.9  
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Of course, recognising that there are limits to his ability to 
understand is not the end for Geertz. His essays ‘Thick 
Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’ and 
‘Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight’ (1973) can be 
read as cornerstones of Performance Studies, as well as of 
anthropology and ethnography. In these essays, Geertz stages 
himself as both a player and an artist: directly engaged on a 
daily basis with the natives in whose village he has pitched his 
tent and as such, taking his cues from them, created his own 
narrative within which he seeks to capture something 
essential about the culture into which he has stumbled. That 
is, the anthropologist tells the story of his encounter with the 
natives, knowing that it’s at least as much his story and not 
precisely theirs that he’s telling, and – in the early 1970s at 
least – he is not necessarily expecting to be corrected. He’s not 
careless in this telling. In fact, he is rather meticulous in 
marshalling the details of his observations, but still, through 
this story he seeks to make visible the Others and their 
culture in a meaningful way. The native winks at him, and in 
trying to make sense of that wink he discovers an entire world 
view.  
In his interpretation of the Balinese cockfight, Geertz 
misunderstands almost everything about the Balinese and 
their culture. There are puns that undermine rather than 
support meaningful engagement – the most egregious, of 
course, attached to the word ‘cock’. There are gaps and 
elisions, remarkable blind spots that have been pointed out in 
the decades since, errors that go beyond worrying about his 
attitude toward the Balinese villagers; for example, only late in 
the narrative does he mention his wife who seems to have 
been with him all along and is not even named in Geertz’s 
thick description. But in his misunderstanding he creates a 
compelling narrative about encounter in which, as a self-
conscious actor in a social drama, he deliberately steps away 
from the high ground of academic authority and makes 
himself available also for critical analysis. Fast forward now 
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about twenty years, to the early 1990s, and we can find a 
whole slew of ethnographers – among them, Renato Rosaldo, 
Vincent Crapanzano, Mary Louise Pratt, James Clifford and 
George Marcus – taking Geertz’s theory and practice to task 
for what is now obvious: natives have eyes too, along with the 
wherewithal to construct their own narratives of encounter.10  
 
 
Photo: Stephen A’Court – Tiki Taane Mahuta, by Tanemahuta 
Gray 
Pictured: Jana Castillo, AnitaHunziker, Mark Bonnington and 
Sharn Te Pou 
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As James Clifford notes in his Introduction to Writing 
Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (1986): ‘The 
making of ethnography is artisanal, tied to the worldly work of 
writing’ (p. 6). Clifford goes on to say: ‘Even the best 
ethnography texts – serious, true fictions – are systems, or 
economies, or truth. Power and history work through them, in 
ways their authors cannot fully control’ (p. 7). He sees the 
ethnographer as ‘a character in a fiction [. . .] at center stage’ 
(p. 14). As idealistic in his own way as his contemporary, 
Dwight Conquergood, Clifford tells us that the point is now ‘to 
dislodge the ground from which persons and groups securely 
represent others.’ He says:  
 
A conceptual shift, “tectonic” in its implications, 
has taken place. We ground things, now, on a 
moving earth. There is no longer any place of 
overview (mountaintop) from which to map 
human ways of life, no Archimedian point from 
which to represent the world. Mountains are in 
constant motion. So are islands: for one cannot 
occupy, unambiguously, a bounded cultural 
world from which to journey out and analyze 
other cultures. Human ways of life increasingly 
influence, dominate, parody, translate, and 
subvert one another. Cultural analysis is always 
enmeshed in global movements of difference and 
power. However one defines it [. . .] a “world 
system” now links the planet’s societies in a 
common historical practice. (p. 22, emphasis 
mine) 
 
This doesn’t mean we’re now all the same. Or that the 
asymmetries of power and status have been, or ever can be, 
equalised. We speak, write and act ourselves into meaningful 
relationships with one another. Ideally we do so in ways that 
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are both self- and other-aware. Utopia? No. And pretending 
otherwise won’t make it so.  
And yet. That we can’t be good people and do ethnography 
at the same time, that we can’t convincingly perform such 
piety, doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do it. Or that we should tie 
ourselves up in apologetic knots in hopes of offsetting the 
power dynamics involved when crossing the cultural divide.  
As talkative and inclined to interrupt as I am, I like the 
way a hui works. Performance ethnography should be a form 
of utu within the framework of a shared, or at least 
intersecting, kaupapa: The writer sets out his/her position in 
a mihi of sorts, beginning with whakapapa and 
tūrangawaewae: who he or she is – who I am – in relation to 
everyone here, how I come to be in this or that room watching 
this performance, what I saw and what I make of it now, 
talking to all of you. In writing, I put my figurative cards on 
the table where everyone can see them; in speaking I stand up 
for myself, say what I’m thinking and take what comes back to 
me. I am also forced to recognise that, even in performance 
and even more in cultural performance, in Māori performance, 
not everything can or should be seen, or understood. That’s ok 
by me. It’s enough to be in the room, as it were. I am not owed 
transparency, explanation or correction. What I want is a 
conversation, a dialog where I can hear the other side on its 
own terms and meet it on mine.  
So for example, in several articles I have argued that the 
performance of Kapa Haka as a staging of recognition and 
resistance set against the constraints of colonisation 
represented by the proscenium arch. In response, I have been 
told that this effect is accidental and secondary to the display 
and celebration of virtuosity in reo and tikanga. Where I see an 
indigenous confrontation with the (not-quite absent) European 
– that is, a theatricalisation of the tension between the 
colonised and the coloniser – performers, spectators and 
kaumatua say the point is the conversation amongst 
themselves and, as such, largely beyond me, because of my 
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very limited grasp of the reo and my coming so late to the 
culture.11 Fair enough. At the same time, my observations are 
useful, I’m told, because they come from the outside, 
provoking my correspondents to counter authoritatively, to 
affirm their deeper understandings and produce the kinds of 
scholarly arguments that I cannot. Regardless, the field is 
growing rapidly. When I started writing about Māori 
performance there was little in English (or even in te reo I’m 
told) of a scholarly persuasion. Now my voice is one of many.12 
You can decide for yourself what it’s worth. 
I am not Māori. I am not a dancer. I see what I see from 
the outside. I miss a lot, misunderstand much, and yes, 
consciously and unconsciously in my writing about Māori 
performance, I do a fair bit of making it up as I go along. 
Writing, for me, is a creative act, a performance, my own little 
wordy dance, and while I often stand corrected, I have 
certainly gained mana internationally for my interpretations of 
Māori performance and culture. At best – and here I admit to 
my own idealism – my publications provoke publications in 
response. At best they serve as the foundation for a 
conversation, multiple conversations; some of these might 
even include me. It’s not a question of being a good or bad 
person, or being right or wrong per se. These values don’t 
disappear, but they sit fairly far apart on a continuum, a 
series of intersecting matrices, really. In the best of all possible 
worlds, I’m not going to understand much of anything fully. 
That’s why I keep looking. 
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1  Mulvey’s wildly influential essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema’ was written in 1973 and first published in Screen in 
1975. By the time it was republished (in her first essay collection, 
Visual and other Pleasures,1989) Mulvey was re-thinking her 
original insights, but although the political terrain has shifted 
many times since, for me they still hold substantial truths about 
the ways we experience and frame the acts of looking and being 
looked at. 
2  The reference to Freaks and the ambivalent refrain ‘one of us’ – 
chanted during the pivotal scene of the wedding between Hans 
(the ‘freak’) and Cleopatra (the ‘norm’) – is intentional. 
3  See, for example, the way Peggy Phelan reifies ‘performative 
writing’ as an academic practice in her introduction to The Ends of 
Performance (1998). 
4  Even Richard Schechner, founder of Performance Studies and 
University Professor at NYU, has made a practice for many years 
of such identifications, most recently identifying himself with the 
99% in a TDR editorial standing with his students at the Occupy 
Wall Street protest (‘Occupy Solidarity’, 2012). 
5  Conquergood cites Mary Douglas as a model, in particular, for her 
method for ‘grid/group analysis’ as discussed in ‘Cultural Bias’ 
(1982).  
6  Conquergood cites a number of texts by Geertz, including ‘From 
the Native’s Point of View’: On the Nature of Anthropological 
Understanding (1974) and Local Knowledge: Further Essays in 
Interpretive Anthropology (1983). Oddly, however, Interpretation of 
Cultures (1973), which is the root of much of what we know of 
Performance Studies, is not directly referenced; even so, its 
essence permeates Conquergood’s essay, especially in the essay’s 
concluding paragraphs.  
7  Please note that I am using the word ‘native’ intentionally, 
introducing it into this paper when I turn to Geertz, because it is 
of its time, and as much for its less than politically correct 
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connotations as because as such it is a word deeply implicated in 
the ethnographic endeavour. 
8  See Uta Hagen’s Respect for Acting, which is grounded in large 
part on the principle that an actor takes responsibility for her 
character’s actions and acting as the character discovers the other 
actors-as-characters only in action, through the interactions of 
the performance as it unfolds, fresh each time. 
9  In this, of course, I am intentionally echoing Deborah Tannen’s 
influential book You Just Don’t Understand, which takes a 
linguistic approach to the war between the sexes. 
10  For example, James Clifford begins Routes: travel and translation 
in the late twentieth century (1997) by rejecting the notion of the 
native village, and the natives within, as being fixed in place and 
time. Rather, following Amitav Ghosh, he picks up the image of 
the ‘traditional, rural village as airline transit lounge’ (p. 1) as the 
starting point for reconsidering ethnographic practice as 
increasingly dialogic and multi-valent.   
11  See Peter Cleave’s elaboration and contextualisation of my work 
on Kapa Haka, which is itself the product of an extended 
conversation, in ‘Memory, body and dance: a review of literature’ 
(2014). 
12  See, for example, Kia Rōnaki: The Māori Performing Arts, edited by 
Rachael Ka’ai-Mahuta, Tania Ka’ai and John Moorfield (2013). 
 
 
